OPINION PAPER
The mean to the end for a renewed Strategic Concept
Dr. M.P. Efthymiopoulos
Biography: (during the publishing time) PhD candidate of the University of Crete, Printed in April 2007
Introduction
In February 2007, at the Munich Conference for Security, the Secretary General of NATO expressed his view on the need for a renewed strategic concept . This paper will examine the “Comprehensive Political Guidance” , a draft paper adopted at the NATO Riga Summit in November 2006 and will request for a renewed security concept, one that complement both the Strategic Concept of 1999 , but also the Comprehensive Political Guidance of the Riga Summit.
During the course of this paper, a variety of questions will be raised and various proposals in relevance to the topic will be put forward. The opinions mentioned in this research do ‘not’ reflect the official policies or opinions of any Government, nor any respective Ministries relevant with the subject or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, but are solely based on personal judgments made as a result of the author’s experiences as a representative at NATO and from academic research relevant to the matter in a PhD level.
A variety of issues need to be addressed. The purpose of this paper is to establish 1) that NATO is in need of a renewed security concept. 2) the Political guidance plan is merely a negotiating tool 3) there is no effective mechanism still to complement the ‘metalaxis’ (transformation) of NATO’s ongoing project. These topics in question are important to the operational, strategic and stuctural levels of NATO’s ongoing transformation. Yet, as NATO decisions are only taken by consensus, by the Heads of State and Government of the 26 members of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), this paper can only go so far as to propose these issues for consideration.
Methodologically, the paper will look upon 1) the new security environment and the asymmetry of terrorism as a key point in defining NATO’s policy today. 2) NATO’s adaptation to the constantly changing security environment. 3) The Comprehensive Political Guidance. 4) NATO’s ongoing transformation. 5) NATO’s policy applied in modern warfare. The paper will call for a renewed Security Concept and a dual track strategy for the ongoing transformation of the Alliance. In conclusion the negative points of the Comprehensive Political Guidance will be mentioned, and the concluding remarks will state that there is a need for further change, that will complement the tactical, operational and strategic transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance.
The new security environment and the asymmetry of terrorism
On the 12th September 2001, NATO invoked for the first time Article 5 of the Washington treaty of 1949. The article concerns the need for collective defense, declaring that “an attack on one is an attack on all member states. Since then, NATO has been actively engaged in major campaigns agaist terrorism, both militarilly and politically.
NATO as a collective alliance, has been a contributor to all its member states that are actively involved on the war against terror. In its ongoing transformation, NATO has been concentrated in developing counter-terrorist operations, impoving abilities in protecting civilians by all forms of attacks, Radiological, Chemical, biological, improving its own capabilities, meaning the measures in a tactical, operational and strategic level, for a combined deployability of NATO forces. At the same time, NATO’s open door policy is on the rise. Existing partners became members, and current partners increased their co-operation in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council as well as NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Russia Councils. Geographically, NATO is currently engaged operationally in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and in the Mediterranean, as a ‘safer area’ provider. Tactically, NATO has offered to train Iraq’s troops and to establish all necessary links for future co-operation of Iraq with NATO structures. At the same time, NATO has adopted a global role in addressing the need for further co-operation on the fight against terror. Strategically, new forms of co-operation are on the rise, especially with countries in the Eastern Hemisphere, such as Australia, Japan and South Korea.
NATO’s adaptation to the constantly changing security environment
At the Istanbul Summit (NATO, 2004) meeting in June 2004, NATO Heads of State and Government stressed the need for further NATO transformation. It was concluded that the need for a restructured Alliance is a necessity, due to the constantly changing security environment. Yet, the first mission that NATO was created for still remains to provide an enhanced collective defense to protect the common security interests of its members.
NATO is adapting to this new security environment. This, at least, is a fact on paper. In all publications from the Diplomatic and Public Division Office of NATO, two very important things are pointed out: NATO’s transformation and NATO’s constant adaptive procedures to the new security environment. In practical terms, NATO operations are a result of the challenges of the 21st century. The creation of the ACT command in Norfolk, Virginia, USA - the ‘Allied Command Transformation’ whose task is to change the procedures by which NATO works, hierarchically and operationally, both at administrative and battle-operated missions, has been a reality since 2002. In Prague in 2002, NATO Heads of State and Government, agreed to transform NATO, in order to improve its operational, strategic and tactical capabilities. The core purpose is to counter multidimensional crises.
Since the Istanbul Summit, NATO’s vision is clear. This vision has been recently complemented at the Riga Summit in 2006 in that NATO is, but should always be, well prepared for the unknown. As a result of the negotiations, the Comprehensive Political Guidance of 2006 was drafted. This plan is the closest to an ‘update’ of the current strategic concept of the Alliance. It legally defines the need for outgoing operations and it complements efforts made to the current status that NATO has reached, but also suggests new ones.
The Comprehensive Political Guidance
In order to understand the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), few basic questions need to be answered: Why do we call it as such? What does it talk about? Where will it lead? Are there any negative aspects on this guidance?
Why do we call it as such?
The Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) has been adopted by all 26 member-states of NATO. On the one hand it complements the up-to this moment NATO’s strategic, operational and structural transformation and on the other becomes the link for the so much needed renewal of NATO’s strategic concept that may or may not happen, at the forecoming NATO Summit meeting as the Secretary General mentioned in 2009. The CPG is the preparatory guide for what needs to be examined, analysed and assessed for the construction of renewed strategic concept for the Alliance.
The CPG is considered as ‘comprehensive’. However, it is only comprehensive because 1) it underlines the sections that need to be renewed in the form of a new plan. 2) It inaugurates the beginning of diplomatic negotiations in both political and military levels of national members that will end in 2009 with an agreed concluding paper for a renewed strategic concept. By that time, all national member states, are expected to evaluate, propose deeper amendments, or reject any proposals that are put forward by this plan, so as to draft a new security concept that will justify all that NATO does or will do in the near future.
The steps made towards a total renewal of NATO’s structural and operational transformation will not conclude without a political and military strategic concept renewal. In short the proposition for a new strategic plan justifies the means to the end. A renewed concept will justify operations outside the traditional area politically, but also legally. Will complement all necessary expenses made operationally and tactically as well as financially, so as to justify the constant request of the Secretary General for a further contribution to the cause. The outcome would be an enhanced co-ordination for the ongoing fight against terror. The ultimate goal politically, is to find a way to promote a new strategic vision at NATO.
What does the Guidance plan talk about?
The Guidance Plan is providing, as mentioned in its introduction, “a framework and political direction for NATOs continuing transformation….setting the priorities for an Alliance with further capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence” .
The plan justifies the operational ability of NATO to conduct operations outside the traditional sphere of influence. It provides the initial steps taken to politically adopt, the NRF (NATO Responce Force) as the core force, to conduct “the most demanding operations” . At the same time, the plan mentions that true challenges are located beyond the traditional sphere of influence.
As NATOs challenges arise, NATO is required to change and constantly transform. At the same time more contributions are expected by member-states. Yet, not all countries share the same view. This is in fact proven, as not all countries share the same burden, and not all countries share the same security views in relations to the challenges raised. In practical terms, this means that although all member-countries contribute financially and operationally, they do not contribute enough, so as to expand operations and policies concretely. That is also why, the plan is considered to be of importance, as it proposes an ever increasing commitment from nations “recognising the primacy of national political decisions, to NATO operarations, be translated into concrete terms by the development and fielding of flexible and sustainable contributions and also by fair sharing of burden” .
Where does it lead?
The comprehensive political guidance is a mean to the end. The end being a renewed strategic concept, the mean is the guidance plan that becomes the missing link between the ongoing military transformation today and the drafting in a political form of the strategic concept.
The text in its part 3 is titled as a guideline for “Alliance Capability Requirements”. Given the ongoing challenges of NATO and by evaluating the current transformation of NATO, we could say that the plan proposes amendments to the current capabilities of NATO. NATO Heads of State and government agreed that the alliance requires “the agility and flexibility to respond to complex and unpredictable challenges”, but also the issue of intelligence and intelligence sharing.
Facing NATO’s current transformation
Despite NATO’s relative change, initiated by the Prague Summit of 2002, where it was agreed that NATO should transform itself, changes have occurred but are still not concrete. The overall re-shaping of NATO’s administrative and operational capability is well accepted by all member states. Yet, prior to 2001, NATO lacked the reason or motive to re-shape. The 2001 terrorist acts in the USA, gave both the USA and consequently NATO, the impetus to alter their policies.
NATO is well on its way to face the new challenges of the 21st century. The motive is now clear: face all asymmetrical threats. The policy: to engage in as many areas as possible to fight the ‘enemy’. Does this therefore mean that NATO members are ready to align ideologically with this warfare phenomenon? If so, then there are few, but real-points that need to be discussed and negotiated on by all 26 member states of NATO.
The most obvious point for discussion is NATO’s clause on defense. If NATO is a defensive alliance then why has it not proceeded on what might be called a ‘passive offensive’? Is there not, according to what is mentioned above, a new form of alignment that clearly is for the interest of all members and is adopted based on the security needs of all?
Otherwise, the following solution is needed. There are countries that offer more than others both in military form as well as in financial aspects to NATO. At a governmental level, what is needed for the Alliance is for few countries to continue, in a democratic way, taking initiatives for the best interests of NATO at the level of 26 member states. However, this jeopardizes the consensus of NATO to be officially declared ‘a two-way Alliance’. Is NATO ready to proceed with this? This is possibly not the case. NATO is not ready to work as a true Alliance, where the faith of one country depends on the other.
For that reason, the question must be asked: Does NATO’s strategic concept need to be redefined? Does the current Comprehensive Political Guidance complement the work of the security concept of 1999? May it be the case that it introduces the negotiating protocol agenda for a renewed strategic concept for the next summit meeting in 2008 or as the Secretary General mentioned in 2009?
It might seem for someone somewhat difficult to understand (a) whether NATO represents a true alliance in its pure form and (b) whether NATO is a defensive or offensive alliance; or, (c) whether NATO is a two-way Alliance that represents the choices and the interests of the few.
In a series of countries that were visited, the aforementioned climate was noticeable, yet somehow different, as in each case, the matter was looked upon from a different interest perspective and angle. On the one hand, during an official NATO visit to the USA (Norfolk Virginia, Washington DC and New York) it was noticed that people believe that the Alliance needs to be re-shaped for the best interest of all its member states. Moreover, it is believed that a two-way NATO is against the clear interests of the USA. Furthermore, a important point was clearly made: NATO needs to re-examine its Security Concept.
An additional testament of a Lieutenant General within NATO at ACT Norfolk, sustainsthe argument for a renewed Strategic Concept - one that will be adopted by all and that will be in favor of all sides, which will project the Alliance’s work.
Of the same opinion, yet looking at the matter from a different perspective based on the national interests was found in France, in a statement by an admiral of the French Navy as well as by a General expressed in Romania and a General in Poland. A German Air-force Commander in Berlin estimated that NATO cannot and should not portray the interests of the few.
NATO is really inevitable, yet for its purpose of change, it is using the wrong reasons. Newly entered countries such as Estonia as an example, are still fearful of their future Euro-Atlantic prospects, due to the fears that have risen since the end of the Soviet Union. Testimonies from Members of Parliament in Estonia show that NATO is necessary, as it reflects and, moreover, satisfies the security needs of the sovereign country of Estonia.
Briefly, what can be said, and the political guidance plan testifies for it, is that what NATO today ‘represents’ is not clear, just yet. The need to face and address the new challenges of asymmetrical threats is well understood, nonetheless, the scope is not apparent. Is it fighting terrorism with its defensive clause, or should it reconsider portraying a true and new form of alliance, which in turn will probably benefit from the majority of involved players? Is NATO ready to change from a defensive Alliance to a new and more offensive Alliance?
The North-Atlantic Organisation in modern warfare
In Sun Tzu’s Art of War, it is stated that “the art of war is important to the State”. Equally, in modern day theory of warfare what could be said is that the modern art of war, combined and substantiated by Steven Walt’s theory (1987) in the book Origins of Alliances, is evenly important towards the continuity of NATO as a supranational entity that portrays a form of collective defense.
Understanding the art of warfare is important towards the best defense of each state that claims to be part of NATO alliance. It is the opinion, that modern day warfare can also be taught at a collective level, in this case within the Alliance, by sharing common experiences and becoming educated on modern day politics and warfare. In this case, NATO has already changed, as it offers first class post-cold war academic and military courses on issues of warfare and international politics at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy.
Nevertheless, NATO’s need to change cannot be only allocated and solved at an academic level. It does not represent a think-tank, but rather a political-military Alliance. It needs to change at its operational as well as at its administrative levels.
The fact of the matter is that, although the Alliance’s core mission is to provide in a collective level of 26 member states, collective defense, it does no longer represent, in full, the security interests of all its 26 member states. The claim that NATO needs to adapt to the 21st century challenges is right, but could it be really applicable in modern cases that relate with security issues?
The proposition at this point is to firstly renew the strategic concept - One that is not based on the old, or on a political guidance that complements the current strategic concept, but rather aimed at a newly defined strategic concept that ‘upgrades’ the efforts made by the old one. A concept as such will provide the necessary legal and political framework to proceed with greater speed to the ending of the existing re-shaping of NATO’s command and operations.
NATO has to clearly stay as engaged as it stands today. Nonetheless, NATO needs to be given a more constructive role. NATO cannot and should not continue to work as a peacekeeping or peace-building force. NATO was created to defend the interests of member states collectively for collective purposes. This means fighting ‘battles’ to safeguard moral democratic values with which it was created, thus supplementing the Charter of the United Nations. What, in plain terms, needs to be altered is the purpose for which NATO stands today.
NATO’s need for a re-newed Strategic Concept
NATO is facing the 21st century challenges. These challenges are accordingly today based on an agenda established by the few and adopted by the rest of members. Irrespective however to this matter, every state has accepted it; yet, it is still arguable whether each state actually agrees with it.
Clear indications are providing us with such information in order to reach such conclusion. One of the most recent and famous cases is the case of Iraq. Another is the difficulties that operationally arise for NATO operations in Afghanistan. At a discussion regarding both issues, military officers from 26 different countries came down to almost the same conclusion: NATO was at a near crisis situation in 2003 due to the Iraq war but also Afghanistan. Nevertheless, all officers agreed, that help towards the faster resolution of both crises, stated in the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, was also a necessity.
Despite the aforementioned, the Alliance’s objective still remains to face all asymmetrical threats. Besides the issue of terrorism, there are threats from those that hold potential Weapons of Mass Destruction, as well as cases of regional instabilities that require a conceptual adaptation of NATO’s capabilities. Other issues, which relate to social affairs, such as the effect of continued globalization and the growing issue of demographic and environmental differences are also included.
Subsequently, there are a variety of issues that need to be considered, keeping in mind the need for a renewed strategic concept. A research made by Pavel Necas (2004), which he presented at NATO’s Defense College, the author proposes four contextual changes and four strategic level changes, at the “level of an enhanced security concept”. In the case of contextual change, the writer proposes “a formalized NATO-EU co-operation, a European-level approach to defense force structures, a more adequately funded Alliance Transformation and the modification of NATO’s decision-making processes”. In the level of strategy, the author proposes “the adoption of pre-emption as a possible NATO option, the refiniment of the NRF and the adoption of a combined warfare strategy as a formal NATO strategy” .
The above-mentioned proposals cannot but all be accepted and they might very well be within parameters, by which we might all agree with. However, they do not represent a realistic scenario for a truly renewed security concept, but rather an enhanced security concept proposal.
The Alliance’s strategic concept (NATO, 1999) of April 23 and 24, 1999, adopted in Washington DC at the celebration of NATO’s 50 years of existence, is correctly interpreted by Peter Faber (2004) in his editorial criticism on Pavel Necas’ shorter version of his research. In the editorial content, research advisor Peter Faber mentions that:
“the document was fourfold:
1) it express “NATO’s enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks,
2) it should identify the central features of the new security environment,
3) it should specify the elements of the Alliance’s broad approach to security and
4) should provide guidelines for the further adaptation of its military forces”.
Reading the strategic concept of 1999, criticism can be aimed at a very small but important detail. As Faber (2004) claimed, the concept was just too “comprehensive and threw all-NATO related strategic considerations into the sink”. In simpler words, the concept was just not realistic enough.
Establishing and complementing some of the proposals put forward by Pavel Necas, this paper suggests several issues for consideration, leading to a renewed strategic concept, rather than an enhanced one, in both contextual as well as at strategic levels:
In general terms NATO:
needs to express its willingness for a new form of a passive-offensive alliance;
has to accept the need for a renewed identification in a renewed security environment;
has to specify the elements of a specific security policy;
has to enhance the comprehensive guidelines for further integration and interoperability of all NATO military forces.
Contextually, NATO:
needs to re-examine most-importantly a new way of decision-making process;
it needs to allocate the legal and financial resources to work as an autonomous supranational entity;
by locating a common enemy, in which in this case terrorism could be it, NATO and the EU could and should find a common operational level, which continue supplementing one another rather than duplicating one another.
In a strategic level however, NATO should consider more practical ways of cost-effective results.
Enhance NATO’s intelligence agency in Moleworth, as NATO’s Central Intelligence Agency (NACIA) that will operate for the common benefit, by consensus decision-making, against all asymmetrical threats and which will supplement a proposal made by Pavel Necas on pre-emptive operations as a NATO strategy;
a common operational management charter should be created;
and finally create NATO’s permanent reaction and crisis management operations force.
Administratively, matters might be more complicated as the actual implementation of the aforementioned proposals might not be this attractive. It is therefore recommended that the administration should consider swifter movements, a greater political will and consequently more decisive decisions, which should nevertheless continue to be taken at the level of 26 members, by consensus.
For the purposes of proper operational management, there should be an administrator for the proposed NATO Central Intelligence Agency (NACIA). The position should be on a rotating chairmanship and with a continuous working agenda. An enhanced agenda should be proposed to the Secretary General and to the 26 members by the adminnistrator. He will previously evaluate the security environment and will propose the best cost-effective solution for management operations in all warfare situations, effective immediately from the time the NAC level of 26 members will accept it.
As such, the administrative level decision-making on crisis information and management operations will be swifter and well put forward by a coordinated proposal by the NATO Central Intelligence Agency (NACIA). NACIA will complement the work of the military committee, as it will provide the best information gathered, organized and based on the security needs of the Alliance to the military committee, which accordingly will provide further details to the Secretary General and to the NAC.
Recomendations for a dual track strategy on transforming NATO
Continuing to transform NATO and thus, creating a renewed security concept, should also include a realistic strategy, which could be dual-track.
As in the case of Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler (2003), that proposed the need for a dual-track strategy for an enhanced transformation of NATO, this paper proposes a dual-track strategy for a renewed strategic concept. This dual-track strategy will provide the tools for NATO to transform and adapt both contextually, but also at the abovementioned strategic level.
The motivations for a renewed strategic transformation are located to both the Washington Summit of 1999 but also to the Prague Summit of 2002 (NATO, 2003). However, prior to the Summit of November 2002, four were the developments for the Prague agenda to take place:
1) the growing perception of a transatlantic gap;
2) consequently, the rejection of help of the USA by Europe;
3) the inability to adapt to face the challenges of the 21st century; and
4) failing to adopt a global agenda.
In turn, what could be said is that a renewed security concept is needed due to new strategic motivations. The Prague Summit nor Riga:
1) did not offer a global agenda;
2) initiated for an ongoing transformation although not clear on its real aim;
3) did not close the transatlantic gap;
4) did not offer new ways of USA-EU-NATO co-operation but only complementation.
What should be offered is:
1) a global agenda;
2) an assessment of the actual enemy(ies);
3) the enhancement of the proposed NACIA;
4) the operational group for crisis management operations based on the assessment of NACIA and the need of preemption; and
5) the agreement on a consensus based but more practical decision-making process.
NATO member states should finally realize that time is elapsing and that NATO is no longer facing towards the future, but rather formulates short-term assessments with the scope of 2015 or 2020, in which few might know whether they are realistic ones. Its involvement is relatively minor than in the period of the Cold War. For those cases, the proposal for a renewed strategic concept is a good basis for negotiation. The political guidance plan in this case has just initiated the debate at the level of 26 member states, with the consultation of advisors, legal officers, practitioners, officers and academics.
Concluding Remarks
By assessing the comprehensive political guidance plan adopted by the 26 heads of State and government, we need also to refer to the negative side of the paper. The point made in this paper although the plan complements the ztrategic concept of 1999 it does not offer what is mentioned in its introduction as an “effective management mechanism”. The plan does not offer a first class strategic, operational and tactical solution to the political and military needs of drafting a new strategic plan. It does not propose clearly the need for a new round of negotiations on the matter of burden-sharing but rather suggests. It does not offer anything of practical need, except the acknowledgement of negotiating the issue of intelligence sharing at an operational level.
For the above mentioned reasons, this paper aimed at examining the comprehensive political guidance, to factuallise the argument that the plan is merely a complementary plan to the strategic concept of 1999. At the same time we proposed for a renewed Strategic Concept. It is the argument of this paper that the Coprehensice Political Guidance only inaugurated the protocol negotiations with outer scope a renewed strategic concept that may possibly be drafted in the very near future.
NATO no longer represents a defense alliance, for which it was created for. Rather it should alter its political and military form to a supranational alliance that looks towards a global involvement - an Alliance that supersedes the reason for which it was created for and that is constantly willing to face the challenges of the 21 century. Its existence depends on the willingness of political Heads of State and Government to take the appropriate steps and initiate those changes if political will is there.
If NATO represents the military moral values and the ethics of a collective supranational alliance that works for the collective interests, which are to defend democratic values, the rule of law and the respect of human rights, then NATO is required to change.
A preliminary assessment and a critique on NATO’s policies were made. The reasons of change have been examined and new ways of amending NATO’s ideological and practical stance proposed. NATO’s need of change is a reality, but also a request, for the well-being of the Alliance member-states. It is believed that a renewed security concept should be considered. The Comprehensive Political Guidance only applies as an introduction to the negotiations. The ultimate goal should remain a renewed security concept.
References
Balzaretti, R. (2004) Financial and Economic Aspects of the Fight Against Terrorism: Some General Considerations, NATO Defense College Occasional Paper Research Branch, Rome, 7-19.
Binnendijk H. and Kugler R.L. (2003) Dual Track Transformation for the Atlantic Alliance, Defense Horizons, Publication of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy National Defense University
Brzezinski, Z. (1997) The Grand Chessboard, Livanis publications (translation in Greek), Athens, 3-93
NATO (1999) The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, North Atlantic Alliance Organisation.
NATO (2000) NATO in the 21st Century, North Atlantic Treaty Diplomacy and Public Division Publications, Brussels.
NATO (2003) The Prague Summit and NATO’s Transformation, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, pp1-109.
NATO (2004) Istanbul Summit, A Reader’s Guide, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, pp.5-136.
Necas P, (2004) Beyond Tradition: New Alliance’s Strategic Concepts, (ed) by Peter Faber, Research Paper NATO Defense College, No.11, pp.1 -156.
Sun Tzu, (2003) The Art of War, Periplous Publications (Translation in Greek), Athens, pp7-108.
Walt S. (1987) The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, pp. 3-300.
The mean to the end for a renewed Strategic Concept
Dr. M.P. Efthymiopoulos
Biography: (during the publishing time) PhD candidate of the University of Crete, Printed in April 2007
Introduction
In February 2007, at the Munich Conference for Security, the Secretary General of NATO expressed his view on the need for a renewed strategic concept . This paper will examine the “Comprehensive Political Guidance” , a draft paper adopted at the NATO Riga Summit in November 2006 and will request for a renewed security concept, one that complement both the Strategic Concept of 1999 , but also the Comprehensive Political Guidance of the Riga Summit.
During the course of this paper, a variety of questions will be raised and various proposals in relevance to the topic will be put forward. The opinions mentioned in this research do ‘not’ reflect the official policies or opinions of any Government, nor any respective Ministries relevant with the subject or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, but are solely based on personal judgments made as a result of the author’s experiences as a representative at NATO and from academic research relevant to the matter in a PhD level.
A variety of issues need to be addressed. The purpose of this paper is to establish 1) that NATO is in need of a renewed security concept. 2) the Political guidance plan is merely a negotiating tool 3) there is no effective mechanism still to complement the ‘metalaxis’ (transformation) of NATO’s ongoing project. These topics in question are important to the operational, strategic and stuctural levels of NATO’s ongoing transformation. Yet, as NATO decisions are only taken by consensus, by the Heads of State and Government of the 26 members of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), this paper can only go so far as to propose these issues for consideration.
Methodologically, the paper will look upon 1) the new security environment and the asymmetry of terrorism as a key point in defining NATO’s policy today. 2) NATO’s adaptation to the constantly changing security environment. 3) The Comprehensive Political Guidance. 4) NATO’s ongoing transformation. 5) NATO’s policy applied in modern warfare. The paper will call for a renewed Security Concept and a dual track strategy for the ongoing transformation of the Alliance. In conclusion the negative points of the Comprehensive Political Guidance will be mentioned, and the concluding remarks will state that there is a need for further change, that will complement the tactical, operational and strategic transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance.
The new security environment and the asymmetry of terrorism
On the 12th September 2001, NATO invoked for the first time Article 5 of the Washington treaty of 1949. The article concerns the need for collective defense, declaring that “an attack on one is an attack on all member states. Since then, NATO has been actively engaged in major campaigns agaist terrorism, both militarilly and politically.
NATO as a collective alliance, has been a contributor to all its member states that are actively involved on the war against terror. In its ongoing transformation, NATO has been concentrated in developing counter-terrorist operations, impoving abilities in protecting civilians by all forms of attacks, Radiological, Chemical, biological, improving its own capabilities, meaning the measures in a tactical, operational and strategic level, for a combined deployability of NATO forces. At the same time, NATO’s open door policy is on the rise. Existing partners became members, and current partners increased their co-operation in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council as well as NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Russia Councils. Geographically, NATO is currently engaged operationally in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and in the Mediterranean, as a ‘safer area’ provider. Tactically, NATO has offered to train Iraq’s troops and to establish all necessary links for future co-operation of Iraq with NATO structures. At the same time, NATO has adopted a global role in addressing the need for further co-operation on the fight against terror. Strategically, new forms of co-operation are on the rise, especially with countries in the Eastern Hemisphere, such as Australia, Japan and South Korea.
NATO’s adaptation to the constantly changing security environment
At the Istanbul Summit (NATO, 2004) meeting in June 2004, NATO Heads of State and Government stressed the need for further NATO transformation. It was concluded that the need for a restructured Alliance is a necessity, due to the constantly changing security environment. Yet, the first mission that NATO was created for still remains to provide an enhanced collective defense to protect the common security interests of its members.
NATO is adapting to this new security environment. This, at least, is a fact on paper. In all publications from the Diplomatic and Public Division Office of NATO, two very important things are pointed out: NATO’s transformation and NATO’s constant adaptive procedures to the new security environment. In practical terms, NATO operations are a result of the challenges of the 21st century. The creation of the ACT command in Norfolk, Virginia, USA - the ‘Allied Command Transformation’ whose task is to change the procedures by which NATO works, hierarchically and operationally, both at administrative and battle-operated missions, has been a reality since 2002. In Prague in 2002, NATO Heads of State and Government, agreed to transform NATO, in order to improve its operational, strategic and tactical capabilities. The core purpose is to counter multidimensional crises.
Since the Istanbul Summit, NATO’s vision is clear. This vision has been recently complemented at the Riga Summit in 2006 in that NATO is, but should always be, well prepared for the unknown. As a result of the negotiations, the Comprehensive Political Guidance of 2006 was drafted. This plan is the closest to an ‘update’ of the current strategic concept of the Alliance. It legally defines the need for outgoing operations and it complements efforts made to the current status that NATO has reached, but also suggests new ones.
The Comprehensive Political Guidance
In order to understand the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), few basic questions need to be answered: Why do we call it as such? What does it talk about? Where will it lead? Are there any negative aspects on this guidance?
Why do we call it as such?
The Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) has been adopted by all 26 member-states of NATO. On the one hand it complements the up-to this moment NATO’s strategic, operational and structural transformation and on the other becomes the link for the so much needed renewal of NATO’s strategic concept that may or may not happen, at the forecoming NATO Summit meeting as the Secretary General mentioned in 2009. The CPG is the preparatory guide for what needs to be examined, analysed and assessed for the construction of renewed strategic concept for the Alliance.
The CPG is considered as ‘comprehensive’. However, it is only comprehensive because 1) it underlines the sections that need to be renewed in the form of a new plan. 2) It inaugurates the beginning of diplomatic negotiations in both political and military levels of national members that will end in 2009 with an agreed concluding paper for a renewed strategic concept. By that time, all national member states, are expected to evaluate, propose deeper amendments, or reject any proposals that are put forward by this plan, so as to draft a new security concept that will justify all that NATO does or will do in the near future.
The steps made towards a total renewal of NATO’s structural and operational transformation will not conclude without a political and military strategic concept renewal. In short the proposition for a new strategic plan justifies the means to the end. A renewed concept will justify operations outside the traditional area politically, but also legally. Will complement all necessary expenses made operationally and tactically as well as financially, so as to justify the constant request of the Secretary General for a further contribution to the cause. The outcome would be an enhanced co-ordination for the ongoing fight against terror. The ultimate goal politically, is to find a way to promote a new strategic vision at NATO.
What does the Guidance plan talk about?
The Guidance Plan is providing, as mentioned in its introduction, “a framework and political direction for NATOs continuing transformation….setting the priorities for an Alliance with further capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence” .
The plan justifies the operational ability of NATO to conduct operations outside the traditional sphere of influence. It provides the initial steps taken to politically adopt, the NRF (NATO Responce Force) as the core force, to conduct “the most demanding operations” . At the same time, the plan mentions that true challenges are located beyond the traditional sphere of influence.
As NATOs challenges arise, NATO is required to change and constantly transform. At the same time more contributions are expected by member-states. Yet, not all countries share the same view. This is in fact proven, as not all countries share the same burden, and not all countries share the same security views in relations to the challenges raised. In practical terms, this means that although all member-countries contribute financially and operationally, they do not contribute enough, so as to expand operations and policies concretely. That is also why, the plan is considered to be of importance, as it proposes an ever increasing commitment from nations “recognising the primacy of national political decisions, to NATO operarations, be translated into concrete terms by the development and fielding of flexible and sustainable contributions and also by fair sharing of burden” .
Where does it lead?
The comprehensive political guidance is a mean to the end. The end being a renewed strategic concept, the mean is the guidance plan that becomes the missing link between the ongoing military transformation today and the drafting in a political form of the strategic concept.
The text in its part 3 is titled as a guideline for “Alliance Capability Requirements”. Given the ongoing challenges of NATO and by evaluating the current transformation of NATO, we could say that the plan proposes amendments to the current capabilities of NATO. NATO Heads of State and government agreed that the alliance requires “the agility and flexibility to respond to complex and unpredictable challenges”, but also the issue of intelligence and intelligence sharing.
Facing NATO’s current transformation
Despite NATO’s relative change, initiated by the Prague Summit of 2002, where it was agreed that NATO should transform itself, changes have occurred but are still not concrete. The overall re-shaping of NATO’s administrative and operational capability is well accepted by all member states. Yet, prior to 2001, NATO lacked the reason or motive to re-shape. The 2001 terrorist acts in the USA, gave both the USA and consequently NATO, the impetus to alter their policies.
NATO is well on its way to face the new challenges of the 21st century. The motive is now clear: face all asymmetrical threats. The policy: to engage in as many areas as possible to fight the ‘enemy’. Does this therefore mean that NATO members are ready to align ideologically with this warfare phenomenon? If so, then there are few, but real-points that need to be discussed and negotiated on by all 26 member states of NATO.
The most obvious point for discussion is NATO’s clause on defense. If NATO is a defensive alliance then why has it not proceeded on what might be called a ‘passive offensive’? Is there not, according to what is mentioned above, a new form of alignment that clearly is for the interest of all members and is adopted based on the security needs of all?
Otherwise, the following solution is needed. There are countries that offer more than others both in military form as well as in financial aspects to NATO. At a governmental level, what is needed for the Alliance is for few countries to continue, in a democratic way, taking initiatives for the best interests of NATO at the level of 26 member states. However, this jeopardizes the consensus of NATO to be officially declared ‘a two-way Alliance’. Is NATO ready to proceed with this? This is possibly not the case. NATO is not ready to work as a true Alliance, where the faith of one country depends on the other.
For that reason, the question must be asked: Does NATO’s strategic concept need to be redefined? Does the current Comprehensive Political Guidance complement the work of the security concept of 1999? May it be the case that it introduces the negotiating protocol agenda for a renewed strategic concept for the next summit meeting in 2008 or as the Secretary General mentioned in 2009?
It might seem for someone somewhat difficult to understand (a) whether NATO represents a true alliance in its pure form and (b) whether NATO is a defensive or offensive alliance; or, (c) whether NATO is a two-way Alliance that represents the choices and the interests of the few.
In a series of countries that were visited, the aforementioned climate was noticeable, yet somehow different, as in each case, the matter was looked upon from a different interest perspective and angle. On the one hand, during an official NATO visit to the USA (Norfolk Virginia, Washington DC and New York) it was noticed that people believe that the Alliance needs to be re-shaped for the best interest of all its member states. Moreover, it is believed that a two-way NATO is against the clear interests of the USA. Furthermore, a important point was clearly made: NATO needs to re-examine its Security Concept.
An additional testament of a Lieutenant General within NATO at ACT Norfolk, sustainsthe argument for a renewed Strategic Concept - one that will be adopted by all and that will be in favor of all sides, which will project the Alliance’s work.
Of the same opinion, yet looking at the matter from a different perspective based on the national interests was found in France, in a statement by an admiral of the French Navy as well as by a General expressed in Romania and a General in Poland. A German Air-force Commander in Berlin estimated that NATO cannot and should not portray the interests of the few.
NATO is really inevitable, yet for its purpose of change, it is using the wrong reasons. Newly entered countries such as Estonia as an example, are still fearful of their future Euro-Atlantic prospects, due to the fears that have risen since the end of the Soviet Union. Testimonies from Members of Parliament in Estonia show that NATO is necessary, as it reflects and, moreover, satisfies the security needs of the sovereign country of Estonia.
Briefly, what can be said, and the political guidance plan testifies for it, is that what NATO today ‘represents’ is not clear, just yet. The need to face and address the new challenges of asymmetrical threats is well understood, nonetheless, the scope is not apparent. Is it fighting terrorism with its defensive clause, or should it reconsider portraying a true and new form of alliance, which in turn will probably benefit from the majority of involved players? Is NATO ready to change from a defensive Alliance to a new and more offensive Alliance?
The North-Atlantic Organisation in modern warfare
In Sun Tzu’s Art of War, it is stated that “the art of war is important to the State”. Equally, in modern day theory of warfare what could be said is that the modern art of war, combined and substantiated by Steven Walt’s theory (1987) in the book Origins of Alliances, is evenly important towards the continuity of NATO as a supranational entity that portrays a form of collective defense.
Understanding the art of warfare is important towards the best defense of each state that claims to be part of NATO alliance. It is the opinion, that modern day warfare can also be taught at a collective level, in this case within the Alliance, by sharing common experiences and becoming educated on modern day politics and warfare. In this case, NATO has already changed, as it offers first class post-cold war academic and military courses on issues of warfare and international politics at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy.
Nevertheless, NATO’s need to change cannot be only allocated and solved at an academic level. It does not represent a think-tank, but rather a political-military Alliance. It needs to change at its operational as well as at its administrative levels.
The fact of the matter is that, although the Alliance’s core mission is to provide in a collective level of 26 member states, collective defense, it does no longer represent, in full, the security interests of all its 26 member states. The claim that NATO needs to adapt to the 21st century challenges is right, but could it be really applicable in modern cases that relate with security issues?
The proposition at this point is to firstly renew the strategic concept - One that is not based on the old, or on a political guidance that complements the current strategic concept, but rather aimed at a newly defined strategic concept that ‘upgrades’ the efforts made by the old one. A concept as such will provide the necessary legal and political framework to proceed with greater speed to the ending of the existing re-shaping of NATO’s command and operations.
NATO has to clearly stay as engaged as it stands today. Nonetheless, NATO needs to be given a more constructive role. NATO cannot and should not continue to work as a peacekeeping or peace-building force. NATO was created to defend the interests of member states collectively for collective purposes. This means fighting ‘battles’ to safeguard moral democratic values with which it was created, thus supplementing the Charter of the United Nations. What, in plain terms, needs to be altered is the purpose for which NATO stands today.
NATO’s need for a re-newed Strategic Concept
NATO is facing the 21st century challenges. These challenges are accordingly today based on an agenda established by the few and adopted by the rest of members. Irrespective however to this matter, every state has accepted it; yet, it is still arguable whether each state actually agrees with it.
Clear indications are providing us with such information in order to reach such conclusion. One of the most recent and famous cases is the case of Iraq. Another is the difficulties that operationally arise for NATO operations in Afghanistan. At a discussion regarding both issues, military officers from 26 different countries came down to almost the same conclusion: NATO was at a near crisis situation in 2003 due to the Iraq war but also Afghanistan. Nevertheless, all officers agreed, that help towards the faster resolution of both crises, stated in the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, was also a necessity.
Despite the aforementioned, the Alliance’s objective still remains to face all asymmetrical threats. Besides the issue of terrorism, there are threats from those that hold potential Weapons of Mass Destruction, as well as cases of regional instabilities that require a conceptual adaptation of NATO’s capabilities. Other issues, which relate to social affairs, such as the effect of continued globalization and the growing issue of demographic and environmental differences are also included.
Subsequently, there are a variety of issues that need to be considered, keeping in mind the need for a renewed strategic concept. A research made by Pavel Necas (2004), which he presented at NATO’s Defense College, the author proposes four contextual changes and four strategic level changes, at the “level of an enhanced security concept”. In the case of contextual change, the writer proposes “a formalized NATO-EU co-operation, a European-level approach to defense force structures, a more adequately funded Alliance Transformation and the modification of NATO’s decision-making processes”. In the level of strategy, the author proposes “the adoption of pre-emption as a possible NATO option, the refiniment of the NRF and the adoption of a combined warfare strategy as a formal NATO strategy” .
The above-mentioned proposals cannot but all be accepted and they might very well be within parameters, by which we might all agree with. However, they do not represent a realistic scenario for a truly renewed security concept, but rather an enhanced security concept proposal.
The Alliance’s strategic concept (NATO, 1999) of April 23 and 24, 1999, adopted in Washington DC at the celebration of NATO’s 50 years of existence, is correctly interpreted by Peter Faber (2004) in his editorial criticism on Pavel Necas’ shorter version of his research. In the editorial content, research advisor Peter Faber mentions that:
“the document was fourfold:
1) it express “NATO’s enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks,
2) it should identify the central features of the new security environment,
3) it should specify the elements of the Alliance’s broad approach to security and
4) should provide guidelines for the further adaptation of its military forces”.
Reading the strategic concept of 1999, criticism can be aimed at a very small but important detail. As Faber (2004) claimed, the concept was just too “comprehensive and threw all-NATO related strategic considerations into the sink”. In simpler words, the concept was just not realistic enough.
Establishing and complementing some of the proposals put forward by Pavel Necas, this paper suggests several issues for consideration, leading to a renewed strategic concept, rather than an enhanced one, in both contextual as well as at strategic levels:
In general terms NATO:
needs to express its willingness for a new form of a passive-offensive alliance;
has to accept the need for a renewed identification in a renewed security environment;
has to specify the elements of a specific security policy;
has to enhance the comprehensive guidelines for further integration and interoperability of all NATO military forces.
Contextually, NATO:
needs to re-examine most-importantly a new way of decision-making process;
it needs to allocate the legal and financial resources to work as an autonomous supranational entity;
by locating a common enemy, in which in this case terrorism could be it, NATO and the EU could and should find a common operational level, which continue supplementing one another rather than duplicating one another.
In a strategic level however, NATO should consider more practical ways of cost-effective results.
Enhance NATO’s intelligence agency in Moleworth, as NATO’s Central Intelligence Agency (NACIA) that will operate for the common benefit, by consensus decision-making, against all asymmetrical threats and which will supplement a proposal made by Pavel Necas on pre-emptive operations as a NATO strategy;
a common operational management charter should be created;
and finally create NATO’s permanent reaction and crisis management operations force.
Administratively, matters might be more complicated as the actual implementation of the aforementioned proposals might not be this attractive. It is therefore recommended that the administration should consider swifter movements, a greater political will and consequently more decisive decisions, which should nevertheless continue to be taken at the level of 26 members, by consensus.
For the purposes of proper operational management, there should be an administrator for the proposed NATO Central Intelligence Agency (NACIA). The position should be on a rotating chairmanship and with a continuous working agenda. An enhanced agenda should be proposed to the Secretary General and to the 26 members by the adminnistrator. He will previously evaluate the security environment and will propose the best cost-effective solution for management operations in all warfare situations, effective immediately from the time the NAC level of 26 members will accept it.
As such, the administrative level decision-making on crisis information and management operations will be swifter and well put forward by a coordinated proposal by the NATO Central Intelligence Agency (NACIA). NACIA will complement the work of the military committee, as it will provide the best information gathered, organized and based on the security needs of the Alliance to the military committee, which accordingly will provide further details to the Secretary General and to the NAC.
Recomendations for a dual track strategy on transforming NATO
Continuing to transform NATO and thus, creating a renewed security concept, should also include a realistic strategy, which could be dual-track.
As in the case of Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler (2003), that proposed the need for a dual-track strategy for an enhanced transformation of NATO, this paper proposes a dual-track strategy for a renewed strategic concept. This dual-track strategy will provide the tools for NATO to transform and adapt both contextually, but also at the abovementioned strategic level.
The motivations for a renewed strategic transformation are located to both the Washington Summit of 1999 but also to the Prague Summit of 2002 (NATO, 2003). However, prior to the Summit of November 2002, four were the developments for the Prague agenda to take place:
1) the growing perception of a transatlantic gap;
2) consequently, the rejection of help of the USA by Europe;
3) the inability to adapt to face the challenges of the 21st century; and
4) failing to adopt a global agenda.
In turn, what could be said is that a renewed security concept is needed due to new strategic motivations. The Prague Summit nor Riga:
1) did not offer a global agenda;
2) initiated for an ongoing transformation although not clear on its real aim;
3) did not close the transatlantic gap;
4) did not offer new ways of USA-EU-NATO co-operation but only complementation.
What should be offered is:
1) a global agenda;
2) an assessment of the actual enemy(ies);
3) the enhancement of the proposed NACIA;
4) the operational group for crisis management operations based on the assessment of NACIA and the need of preemption; and
5) the agreement on a consensus based but more practical decision-making process.
NATO member states should finally realize that time is elapsing and that NATO is no longer facing towards the future, but rather formulates short-term assessments with the scope of 2015 or 2020, in which few might know whether they are realistic ones. Its involvement is relatively minor than in the period of the Cold War. For those cases, the proposal for a renewed strategic concept is a good basis for negotiation. The political guidance plan in this case has just initiated the debate at the level of 26 member states, with the consultation of advisors, legal officers, practitioners, officers and academics.
Concluding Remarks
By assessing the comprehensive political guidance plan adopted by the 26 heads of State and government, we need also to refer to the negative side of the paper. The point made in this paper although the plan complements the ztrategic concept of 1999 it does not offer what is mentioned in its introduction as an “effective management mechanism”. The plan does not offer a first class strategic, operational and tactical solution to the political and military needs of drafting a new strategic plan. It does not propose clearly the need for a new round of negotiations on the matter of burden-sharing but rather suggests. It does not offer anything of practical need, except the acknowledgement of negotiating the issue of intelligence sharing at an operational level.
For the above mentioned reasons, this paper aimed at examining the comprehensive political guidance, to factuallise the argument that the plan is merely a complementary plan to the strategic concept of 1999. At the same time we proposed for a renewed Strategic Concept. It is the argument of this paper that the Coprehensice Political Guidance only inaugurated the protocol negotiations with outer scope a renewed strategic concept that may possibly be drafted in the very near future.
NATO no longer represents a defense alliance, for which it was created for. Rather it should alter its political and military form to a supranational alliance that looks towards a global involvement - an Alliance that supersedes the reason for which it was created for and that is constantly willing to face the challenges of the 21 century. Its existence depends on the willingness of political Heads of State and Government to take the appropriate steps and initiate those changes if political will is there.
If NATO represents the military moral values and the ethics of a collective supranational alliance that works for the collective interests, which are to defend democratic values, the rule of law and the respect of human rights, then NATO is required to change.
A preliminary assessment and a critique on NATO’s policies were made. The reasons of change have been examined and new ways of amending NATO’s ideological and practical stance proposed. NATO’s need of change is a reality, but also a request, for the well-being of the Alliance member-states. It is believed that a renewed security concept should be considered. The Comprehensive Political Guidance only applies as an introduction to the negotiations. The ultimate goal should remain a renewed security concept.
References
Balzaretti, R. (2004) Financial and Economic Aspects of the Fight Against Terrorism: Some General Considerations, NATO Defense College Occasional Paper Research Branch, Rome, 7-19.
Binnendijk H. and Kugler R.L. (2003) Dual Track Transformation for the Atlantic Alliance, Defense Horizons, Publication of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy National Defense University
Brzezinski, Z. (1997) The Grand Chessboard, Livanis publications (translation in Greek), Athens, 3-93
NATO (1999) The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, North Atlantic Alliance Organisation.
NATO (2000) NATO in the 21st Century, North Atlantic Treaty Diplomacy and Public Division Publications, Brussels.
NATO (2003) The Prague Summit and NATO’s Transformation, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, pp1-109.
NATO (2004) Istanbul Summit, A Reader’s Guide, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, pp.5-136.
Necas P, (2004) Beyond Tradition: New Alliance’s Strategic Concepts, (ed) by Peter Faber, Research Paper NATO Defense College, No.11, pp.1 -156.
Sun Tzu, (2003) The Art of War, Periplous Publications (Translation in Greek), Athens, pp7-108.
Walt S. (1987) The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, pp. 3-300.
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